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Abstract: The impact of  female directors on firm performance has lacked consistency in the previously
conducted empirical studies, which may be due to the endogeneity problem, or certain characteristics (i.e.
governance, industry, competition). This study examines the relationship between female directors and
firm performance by addressing those problems. This study analyses all non-financial UK listed firms
during the period 2004-2012 and employs several econometric models. The regression results indicate
that there is little evidence that female directors have a positive and strong relationship with firm perfor-
mance. But, further analysis reports that the UK’s small listed firms experience a positive significant effect,
because small firms do not suffer from the problem of  over-monitoring and they have more flexibility
in composing their boards of  directors.
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Introduction
Gender diversity on the boards of di-
rectors has been of major interest to corpo-
rate governance in recent years. Because of
the apparent under-representation of females
on the boards of directors, some EU coun-
tries (i.e. Norway, Finland) have introduced
the idea of imposing quotas for female direc-
tors on the boards of large corporations
(Smith et al. 2006; Nekhili and Gatfaoui
2013; Chapple and Humprey 2014).
In the UK, although there has been no
formal regulation or law, the Davies report
explicitly recommends a 25 percent represen-
tation by females on the boards of FTSE100
firms by 2015. As a consequence, the latest
figures indicate that female directorships in
FTSE index firms have increased from 12
percent in 2011 to 25 percent in 2014 (Stern
2014). In other words, the government inter-
vention successfully allowed female candi-
dates to gain better access to the UK listed
firms’ boardrooms.
Nevertheless, knowledge of the impact
of  female directors on firm performance
lacks consistency. Some studies (Erhardt et
al. 2003; Carter et al. 2003; Campbell and
Minguez-Vera. 2007; Luckerath-Rovers 2013;
Liu et al. 2014; Strom et al. 2014, Green and
Homroy 2016) report positive impacts, while
others (Smith et al. 2006; Adams and Ferreira.
2009; Carter et al. 2010; Galbreath 2011;
Jurkus et al. 2011; Ahern and Dittmar 2012)
fail to report the same result.
The purpose of this study is to examine
the relationship between female directors and
firm performance. This study contributes to
the governance studies, which specifically
discuss female directors, via three channels.
Firstly, this study uses rigorous econometric
techniques in order to address the endo-
geneity problems (Adams and Ferreira 2009;
Liu et al. 2014; Strom et al. 2014). Secondly,
this study uses a larger dataset than previous
related studies in the UK (Ryan and Haslam
2005; Gregory-Smith et al. 2013). Finally, this
study adds analysis of  the firms’ sizes, as the
UK’s large listed firms encounter a certain
kind of pressure in the composition of their
boards’ members (Mallin and Ow-Yong
2008).
The analysis reveals that female direc-
tors tend not to significantly influence firm
performance. At first, the estimations of  fe-
male directors tended to have positive and
significant estimations in the OLS model, but
the sign and significance change in the two
stage-least-square and GMM models, which
suggests female directors and firm perfor-
mance suffer from an endogeneity problem.
Moreover, by splitting the sample, there is
strong evidence that firm size may affect the
relationship between female directors and
firm performance. Small firms tend to gain
the most benefits from appointing female di-
rectors, because these firms suffer less from
outside intervention than the large firms, in
terms of  composing their boards’ structures.
The remainder of the study is organized
as follows: Section 2 discusses the theoreti-
cal perspective of  board (gender) diversity.
Section 3 and Section 4 look at the hypoth-
eses development and research methodology
respectively. Section 5 provides the empiri-
cal evidence of  the study. Finally, Section 6
is the conclusion of  the study.
Literature Review
Robinson and Dechant (1997) argue
that board diversity can enhance the growth
of  a firm’s business through several ways. (1)
As the market becomes more diverse in terms
of  race and ethnicity, aligning the board’s di-
versity with a market demographic enhances
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the understanding of the current and poten-
tial market. (2) Board diversity improves cre-
ativity and innovation because different
races, ages, and genders are associated with
different attitudes, cognitives, and beliefs. (3)
Board diversity improves the decision mak-
ing processes that lead to better problem solv-
ing. (4) Board diversity enhances effective
leadership. (5) Board diversity promotes glo-
bal relationships and strategic advantages in
global competition.
From the agency theory’s point of  view,
there are several ways to link gender diver-
sity on the boards and agency problems.
Firstly, Carter et al. (2003) argues that board
diversity is equivalent to board independence,
because diverse boards do not have the tra-
ditional backgrounds that insider directors
have. Thus, more diverse boards will reduce
agency problems. Secondly, Ahern and
Dittmar (2012) argue that appointing female
directors can reduce the influence of  a CEO,
who may be pursuing his/her own private
agenda, rather than working for the share-
holders’ interests (Bebchuk and Fried 2005).
Appointing female directors can also reduce
the agency cost.
Hillman et al. (2000), supporting the
resource based theory, argues that diverse
boards provide more unique resources and
information, that may benefit the decision
making processes. Within a diverse board,
there exist diverse perspectives and non-tra-
ditional alternatives to certain problems.
Hillman et al. (2007) argues that a board’s
diversity shows the firm’s commitment to
minorities, which can add legitimacy to a
firm. It gives a signal that firms do promote
equal opportunities for current and potential
employees.
The stakeholder theory’s view is that the
board’s main duty is to maintain good rela-
tionships with the stakeholders (customers,
regulators, creditors, etc.). The proponents of
the stakeholder theory argue that corporations
should reflect their external environment, for
instance their society, which is composed of
different genders, races, and ethnic groups.
As a result, gender diversity on the board is a
rational consequence, or even an obligatory
implication, for some countries. However,
Rose (2007) argues that imposing such a law
may not be appropriate for listed firms, as
they are different from democratic institutions.
The human capital theory is related to
the directors’ characteristics which are use-
ful and beneficial to firms. Singh et al. (2008)
reports that female directors in FTSE100
companies tend to have an MBA degree and
international experience. Sealy et al. (2007)
reports that female directors tend to have a
title with their name, for instance an academic
title (Prof, Dr), civic or political titles (Dame,
Baroness) , or aristocratic titles (Lady,
Honourable). Terjesen et al. (2009) reports
that female qualifications are relatively simi-
lar to male qualifications, but females tend
to be less experienced than males in terms of
their business experience. Similarly, Singh and
Vinnicombe (2004) argue that the lack of
female networks and experience in executive
positions are the main reason why females
are less attractive than their male counter-
parts.
Given those theories, there are two im-
portant inferences. Firstly, the presence of
females on the board is not entirely based on
reasons connected to the businesses’ perspec-
tive. There is substantial pressure from the
firms’ external environment (e.g. female di-
rectors’ quotas) which influences the decision
to hire female directors (Singh and
Vinnicombe 2004). Secondly, as a conse-
quence of the first implication, the effects
of gender diversity on the board may not be
optimal for the board, in terms of  its effec-
Pasaribu
148
tiveness and firm performance. Terjesen et
al. (2009) argues that female directors can
improve a board’s effectiveness and firm per-
formance in many ways, but they may not
directly influence a firm’s bottom line, due
to multi-level processes.
Hypothesis Development
There are two objectives in the study:
(1) examining the effect of gender diversity
on the boards and (2) examining the effect
of  gender diversity on firm performance,
with respect to firm size. This section tries
to develop the hypotheses for each of the
study’s objectives.
Gender Diversity and Firm
Performance
Gender inequality on the boards of di-
rectors has been a systemic problem in the
corporate world. Consequently, governments,
particularly in the developed countries, have
imposed quotas to increase the presence of
females on the boards. They argue that in-
creasing the diversity of the boards brings a
larger pool of  talent, in terms of  their exper-
tise, experience, and connections, which leads
to better governance and firm performance
(The Davies report 2012). This means that
there is a positive relationship between fe-
male directors and firm performance
However, prior empirical studies have
been inconsistent in their reporting of the
contribution of  female directors to firm per-
formance. Several studies have found a posi-
tive association between gender diversity and
firm performance (Carter et al. 2003; Erhardt
et al. 2003; Carter et al. 2003; Campbell and
Minguez-Vera 2007; Luckerath-Rovers
2013).
There are two reasons why these stud-
ies successfully report a positive association.
Firstly, all of  the empirical analyses in those
studies are not that advanced, which makes
it difficult to decide whether the result is cor-
rect, or implies an endogeneity issue.  Sec-
ondly, most of  them were conducted in the
early 2000s, when the quota rules on gender
diversity had not yet been introduced. Firms
in the 1990s and the early 2000s had more
flexibility in composing their boards than
those in the middle or late 2000s do.
While most of those studies focused on
firms in developed countries, Liu et al. (2014)
investigated gender diversity in Chinese listed
firms and Strom et al. (2014) used firms from
73 developing countries. Both studies report
that female directors significantly affect firm
performance in the developing markets, in
which listed firms are less regulated.
By contrast, other studies do not find
evidence that females directly influence firm
performance. Adams and Ferreira (2009) re-
port a negative association between female
directors and firm performance in the US. A
positive association cannot be found in the
Scandinavian countries, in which gender di-
versity has been mandated by law (Smith et
al. 2006; Rose 2007 Ahern and Dittmar
2012).
Consistently, the UK-based studies tend
to indicate that there is no positive associa-
tion between gender diversity on the boards
and firm performance. Haslam et al. (2010)
reports that there is no association between
the presence of female directors on a board
and firm performance for FTSE100 compa-
nies. Gregory-Smith et al. (2013) did not find
evidence that the presence of females on
boards is associated with higher firm perfor-
mance.
Ideally, firms are free to appoint direc-
tors without considering their directors’ gen-
der. But, the UK market regulator, through
the Davies report, has explicitly recommended
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boards comprising of 25 percent female di-
rectors. It means that firms appoint female
directors because of pressure being applied,
rather than for strategic reasons or the quali-
fications of  the candidates. This kind of  pres-
sure does improve firm performance (Ahern
and Dittmar 2012; Low et al. 2015). There-
fore, the null hypothesis is:
H
1 
: Gender diversity on the boards has no impact
on firm performance in the UK.
Firm Size Effect
The size of  firm has been scrutinized
in finance studies such as in the models of
asset pricing  (Fama and French 1993), the
decisions of  financing or capital structure
(Berger and Udell 1995), the decisions of
merger and acquisition (Moeller et al. 2004;
Offenberg 2009), and the effectiveness of the
board of directors (Setia-Atmaja 2008). In
other words, the size of  firms have impor-
tant role in many aspects of  finance studies.
In the UK, the market regulator imposes
different standards in terms of  disclosure and
governance practices, according to the size
of  a firm. For instance, firms that are listed
on the Alternative Investment Market (AIM)
are not obliged to follow all the The UK Cor-
porate Governance Code (Mallin and Ow-
Yong 2008). In other words, the AIM firms
are in a less-regulated environment than the
large firms (e.g. FTSE100 and FTSE250).
Dahya et al (2002) reported that there is a
significant difference between large firms and
small firms with regard to their compliance
with the Cadbury recommendations. More-
over, the recommendation to appoint more
female directors is aimed at the FTSE100
firms (Davies Report 2012).
The recent report indicates that small
firms may have different governance practices
from the large firms among the Russell 3000
companies.1 Small firms tend to have less
board committee (audit, compensation, nomi-
nation) meetings, staggered boards, less in-
dependent directors, and fewer females on
their boards. This report supports previous
studies, in which larger firms tend to have
more non-executive directors (Denis and Sarin
1999) and entrenched CEOs (Hazarika et al.
2012), which leads to their low levels of gov-
ernance index (Farag et al. 2014).
Appointing female directors is highly
associated with a board’s effectiveness
(Adams and Ferreira 2009; Jurkus et al. 2011;
Abbot et al. 2012; Srinidhi et al. 2011; Kyaw
et al. 2015; Chen et al. 2016) in terms of: (1)
better governance and a good atmosphere in
the board room; (2) accountability and trans-
parency in financial reporting; (3) improved
decision-making in investment and financing
decisions. Appointing female directors to
firms with strong governance, which is
proxied by the large firms, leads to the prob-
lem of  over-monitoring. Therefore, the null
hypotheses with respect to firm size are:
H
2 
: Gender diversity on the boards has no impact
for large listed firms in the UK
H
3 
: Gender diversity on the boards has no impact
for small listed firms in the UK
Research Framework
This study tries to investigate the rela-
tionship between female directors and firm
performance by examining without (Figure
1.a) and with (Figure 1.b) the effect of  firm
size. As the composition of the boards of
large firms tends to suffer from government
1Ernst and Young Corporate Governance Centre. May 2013. Governance Trends and Practices at US Companies:
A Review of Small and Mid-sized Companies.
Pasaribu
150
interference, particularly in the developed
countries, the effect of female directors in
large firms may be less significant than in the
small firms. The research framework can be
seen in Figure 1.
Methods
This section is divided into three parts,
which are the sample and data, the regres-
sion model and variables, and the instrumen-
tal variables.
Sample Selection and Data
Sources
This study uses all the non-financial
firms listed in the UK over a nine-year pe-
riod (2004-2012), as the quality of the data
on directorships is poor prior to 2004.  In or-
der to be included in this study, there are sev-
eral requirements which needed to be fulfilled:
(1) the firms must be non-financial firms,
those that have an Industry Classification
Benchmark (ICB) equal to 8 are excluded
from the sample; (2) due to the lack of avail-
able data on boards of directors, the head-
quarters of  the selected firms must be in the
UK.
This study uses multiple sources to ob-
tain the variables under investigation. The
data on firms’ board characteristics were
mostly obtained from the Financial Analysis
Made Easy (FAME) database, such as
thename, date of  birth, nationality, gender,
date of  appointment, of  directors. The posi-
tions (e.g. CEO, chairman, financial director)
and functions (e.g. executive and non-execu-
tive) are obtained from the Thomson ONE
Banker and the Bloomberg databases, which
were hand-collected. Proxies for firms’ per-
formance came from the FAME and the
Bloomberg databases.
Female Directors 
Firm Performance Large Firm 
Performance 
Female Directors 
Small Firm 
Performance 
(A) 
H2 
Female 
Directors 
Quotas 
No Female 
Directors 
Quotas 
H1 H3 
(B) 
Figure 1. Research Framework
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Regression Model and Variables
The general form of  the regression
model is as Equation 1.
Firm
Perfomance
it 
=
.......................................(1)
Where i indexes the firms and t is a yearly
time index. The 
k
 and 
t
 variables represent
the firms’ industry and year respectively. The
female directors’ measure is the fraction of
female directors on the boards, while the
boards’ characteristics, and firms’ character-
istics contain several variables which can be
seen in Table 1.
There were three regression models
used in this study, which were the OLS
model, the two-Staged Least Square (2SLS)
model and the Arellano-Bond model. Previ-
ous studies (Adams and Ferreira 2009; Liu et
al. 2014) indicate that the OLS model is prone
to causal problems, in which positive estima-
tions mean well-performing firms tend to
appoint female directors rather than the pres-
ence of  female directors increasing firm per-
for mance. This term is known as the
endogeneity problem.

 
+ Female_Directors_Measure
it
+ Board_Characteristics
it
+ Firm_Characteristics
it
  +  
k
+ 
t 
+ e
it
Variables Descriptions 
Dependent Variables  
ROA 
Ratio between net-income and book value of total assets at the end of 
year 
Profit margin Net profit divided by total turnover (sales) 
  
Gender Diversity  
Fract_female Ratio between female directors and total directors  
  
Board Characteristics  
Board size Total number of directors 
Fract_ned The number of non-executive director divided by board size 
  
Firm Characteristics  
Firm size Logarithm of total asset 
Firm age The difference between year-t with firm establishment year 
Blockholder The percentage of firm ownership that held by the largest shareholder 
Debt ratio Total debt divided by total assets 
Total employee Logarithm of firm total employee 
  
Instrumental Variables  
Fem_exp 
The fraction of man director to total directors who have connection to 
female director  
ICB_one Fraction of female in the same one-digit ICB code industry 
ICB_two Fraction of female in the same two-digit ICB code industry 
ICB_three Fraction of female in the same three-digit ICB code industry 
ICB_four Fraction of female in the same four-digit ICB code industry 
 
Table 1. Variable Descriptions
Pasaribu
152
Wooldridge (2010) recommends a two-
step procedure to address this endogeneity.
The first step is to regress the suspected en-
dogenous variable, which is the female direc-
tors, with all the possible predetermined vari-
ables. The second step is to use the predicted
values of the endogenous variable from the
1st regression as an explanatory variable in the
model of interest.
In order to employ the 2SLS models, it
is necessary to find the instrumental vari-
ables. This study used two instrumental vari-
ables to address them. The variables are the
male directors’ connection to the female di-
rectors (Adams and Ferreira 2009; Levi et al.
2013) and the fraction of female directors in
the same industry (Brammer et al. 2007; Liu
et al. 2014). It is expected that both variables
are positive.
The Instrumental Variable model (1st
stage regression) is:
Female
Directors
it 
=
.......................................(2)
The final model is the Arellano-Bond
model. This model is known as a dynamic
model because the model includes the lagged
firm performance as an explanatory variable.
Thus Equation 2 is transformed into:
Female
Directors
it 
=
The specification of the Arellano-Bond
model is very important when addressing the
endogeneity issue. This study employs the
same approach as Adams and Ferreira (2009),
who used two lagged periods and all the sub-
sequent lagged periods of  firm performance,
and the one period lag of the independent
variables as the instrumental variables.
This study used two dependent vari-
ables, which are the Return On Assets (ROA)
and the profit margin. Both measures have
been widely used in previous female director
related studies, for instance ROA is in Erhardt
et al. (2003), Adams and Ferreira (2009), and
Strom et al. (2014) while the profit margin
has been used by Smith et al. (2006) and Liu
et al. (2014). The full definitions of the de-
pendent and independent variables can be
seen in Table1.
Results
This section is divided into four sections,
which are the descriptive analysis, instrumen-
tal variable analysis, regression analysis, and
research discussion.
Descriptive Analysis
Table 2 indicates the development of
female directors in the UK’s non-financial
listed firms. There is a tendency that more
listed firms are hiring female directors. In
2004, 73.8 percent of the total number of
firms did not have a female on their board,
but that figure has reduced to 59 percent by
2012. The fraction of female directors who
sit on the boards has increased gradually, from
5.0 percent to 8.8 percent during the period
2004 to 2012.
Even though more female directors have
been appointed, the proportion of females
who are hired as executive directors has
tended to be stagnant. The fraction of non-
executive female directors has increased by
more than twice between 2004 and 2012,
while the fraction of executive directors re-
mains at around 2.5 percent.

 
+ Male_connection
it
+ Demale_industry
it
+ Firm_Characteristics
it
  + 
t 
+
e
it
Firm Perfomance
it-1
+ Female_Directors_Measure
it
+ Board_Characteristics
it
+ Firm_Characteristics
it
+ 
t 
+ e
it
..............................(3)
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Outsider_code equals to 1 if the CEO is not the owner or CEO joins the firm less than 1 year, owner_code equals to 0 if else.
Board_size is total of director. prop_ned is the fraction of non-executive director. prop_ined is the fraction of independent
non-executive director. roa is net profit divided by total asset (ROA). prof_margin is net profit divided by total sales (profit
margin). Asset is total firm assets. Employf2 is total firm employee. firm_age is the difference between end date of calendar year
and firm establishment date. block is percentage owned by top blockholder. Debt_ratio is total debt divided by total asset.
ICB_three is the fraction of  female director within the same 3-digit industry code. Fem_exp is the fraction of  male director who
ever works with female director on other board. roa, prof_margin, asset, employe and debt_ratio are winsorized at 1 percent and
99 percent
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics
Table 2. The Development of   Female Director in the UK listed Firms between 2004
and 2012
Directors are total individuals (directors) in the sample. Fraction of female is total female director divided by total directors.
Female NED is total female non-executive director divided by directors. Female exec is total female executive director divided
by total director. No female director is the fraction of firms with no female director. One female director is the fraction of firm
with one female director. Two female directors is the fraction of  firms with two female directors. Three or more female director
is the fraction of  firms with three or more female director. Female CEO is the fraction of  firms with female CEO. Female Chair
is the fraction of firm with chairwoman.
Variable N Mean StdDev Q1 Median Q3 
CEO characteristics 
     
 Outsider_code 10,656 0.31 0.46 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Board Characteristics 
      board_size 10,680 6.43 2.28 5.00 6.00 8.00 
prop_ned 10,680 0.51 0.16 0.40 0.50 0.63 
prop_ined 10,680 0.40 0.19 0.29 0.40 0.55 
Firm Performance 
      roa 10,217 -0.08 0.37 -0.10 0.03 0.09 
prof_margin 9,473 -2.10 10.95 -0.10 0.03 0.08 
Firm Characteristics 
      asset ('000) 10,249 890,411 3,433,844 10,132 42,200 218,414 
employ 10,049 4,533 14,035 53 255 1,714 
firm_age 10,680 23.19 28.23 5.58 10.98 26.23 
block 10,467 0.22 0.15 0.12 0.17 0.27 
debt_ratio 10,246 0.51 0.34 0.28 0.48 0.67 
Instrumental Variables 
      icb_three 10,656 0.07 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.09 
fem_exp 10,680 0.30 0.26 0.00 0.25 0.50 
Year Firms 
Number 
of 
Directors 
Fraction 
of 
Females 
Fraction of 
NED 
Females 
Fraction of 
Executive 
Females 
Firms with 
no Female 
Director 
Female 
CEO 
Female 
Chair 
2004 1,181 7,628 0.050 0.026 0.024 0.738 0.025 0.007 
2005 1,366 8,787 0.056 0.030 0.026 0.717 0.031 0.007 
2006 1,401 8,882 0.058 0.032 0.026 0.707 0.037 0.009 
2007 1,373 8,765 0.059 0.032 0.027 0.706 0.039 0.012 
2008 1,241 7,922 0.060 0.034 0.026 0.695 0.038 0.013 
2009 1,119 7,104 0.063 0.038 0.025 0.685 0.036 0.013 
2010 1,053 6,809 0.067 0.043 0.024 0.666 0.036 0.015 
2011 998 6,500 0.074 0.050 0.024 0.643 0.035 0.018 
2012 948 6,222 0.088 0.063 0.025 0.590 0.033 0.019 
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Yet, less than 4 percent of  the total
number of  firms have appointed a female as
their CEO. These results are relatively simi-
lar to previous studies (Ahern and Dittmar
2012; Gregory-Smith et al. 2013), in which
the increase in female participation on boards
is more likely to be through the non-execu-
tive function rather than any executive func-
tion, which could suggest that there still ex-
ists gender bias in the appointment of the
executive directors.
Table 3 shows the mean, median, stan-
dard deviation, and 25th and 75th percentiles
of the variables that are possibly used in the
regression analyses. There is a significant dif-
ference in the available observations in rela-
tion to the firms’ profit margins. This discrep-
ancy may be as a result of using two data-
bases, which are the FAME database (UK-
based) and the Bloomberg database (US-
based). In this case, the Bloomberg database
may not provide financial information on the
firms that are being delisted or acquired by
other firms.
The mean of board size for UK listed
firms is between 6 and 7 directors, of  which
about half  are non-executive directors. The
final section in Table 3 shows the instrumen-
tal variables, which are the fraction of females
within the same 3 digit-ICB code and the
fraction of male directors who work with a
female director on other boards. The means
of both variables are 7 percent and 28 per-
cent respectively. The detail of  these vari-
ables is discussed in the next section.
Table 4 show the correlation between
firm performance measures, female represen-
tative measures and the other controls vari-
ables. Multicolinearity is likely to happen when
the absolute value of the coefficient correla-
tion is close to 0.7 or higher. This study uses
two proxies to measure firm size, which are
firms’ total assets and firms’ total employ-
ees. Both variables have a strong positive
correlation with board size. Large firms tend
to have large boards as well. As a conse-
quence, this study uses the total employees
as a proxy of  firm size rather than the total
assets in the regression analysis.
The instrumental variables also have
positive correlations with the fraction of fe-
male directors, as previously expected. There
is an early sign that firms tend to follow other
firms with the same ICB code, in terms of
the level of female participation on their
boards. Likewise, the fraction of  male direc-
tors who work with female directors on other
boards has a positive correlation with the
number of  female directors. Those relation-
ships are substantially higher for firms with
non-executive female directors than for firms
with female executive directors.
Table 5 compares the firm characteris-
tics between firms that have at least one fe-
male director and firms with no female di-
rectors, across firm-years. Most of  the char-
acteristics of  a firm that hires at least one
female director are different from those of
firms with no female directors. Firms with
female directors tend to be bigger (in terms
of their total number of employees and
board’s size), more profitable, more efficient,
and be well established than the firms with
no female directors. Table 5 indicates that
firms with female directors tend to be more
profitable than firms with no female direc-
tors.
Instrumental Variable Analysis
Figure 1 shows the distribution of fe-
male directors for UK listed firms according
to the 2-digit ICB code. Firms are likely to
hire female directors when they are consumer
based, such as in the retail, media, personal
and household goods, and healthcare sectors.
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The participation of females on boards is also
relatively high in the utilities and telecom-
munications sectors. Conversely, the number
of  female directors is low for firms in auto-
mobiles and parts, chemicals, basic resources,
and the oil and gas sectors. This instrumen-
tal variable is expected to have a positive as-
sociation with the fraction of female direc-
tors in the regression analysis.
Figure 1. Mean of  Fraction of  Female Directors Based on the Industry
ROA is net profit divided by total asset. profit margin is net profit divided by total sales. Board size is total of  director.
Fraction of  NED is the fraction of  non-executive director. Total employee is total firm employee. Blockholder is
percentage owned by top blockholder. Firm age is the difference between end date of calendar year and firm establish-
ment date. Debt ratio is total debt divided by total asset. *** indicates significance at the 1 percent level
Table 5. Comparisons between Firm with and without Female Director
Firms 
Characteristics 
Firms with Female 
Director 
  
Firms without 
Female Director 
Difference 
N Mean   N Mean 
ROA 3,233 -0.01 
 
6,984 -0.11 0.10*** 
Profit Margin 3,093 -1.01 
 
6,380 -2.63 1.62*** 
Board Size 3,337 7.59 
 
7,343 5.89 1.70*** 
Fraction of NED 3,337 0.54 
 
7,343 0.49 0.05*** 
Total Employee 3,199 12,501.50 
 
6,850 2,361.40 10,140.10*** 
Blockholder 3,280 0.20 
 
7,187 0.22 0.02*** 
Firm Age 3,337 26.85 
 
7,343 21.54 5.31*** 
Debt Ratio 3,236 0.56   7,010 0.81 0.25*** 
157
Gadjah Mada International Journal of  Business – May-August, Vol. 19, No. 2, 2017
The Regression Analysis
This section is divided into two sec-
tions, which are the analysis of all the obser-
vations and the analysis of the small and
large firms.
Analysis of  female directors on firm
performance
Table 6 presents the regression estima-
tions between the ROA (dependent variable)
and the independent variables for all the ob-
servations.2 The fraction of  female directors
in the OLS regression analysis is positively
associated with firms’ ROA, which is rela-
tively the same as found by previous studies
(Adams and Ferreira 2009; Liu et al. 2014).
However, the results are prone to endogeneity
problems
In Model 2 and Model 3, this study
employs a two-stage least regression. Model
2 and Model 3 usethe fraction of males with
connections to female directors (fem_exp)
and the fraction of female directors in the
same industry (icb_code) as the instrumen-
tal variables. There are several ways to check
the reliability and effectiveness of  the instru-
mental variables in the STATA software.
Firstly, it can be done by checking the signifi-
cance of  the instrumental variables in the first
stage regression. When the instrumental vari-
ables are statistically significant, the fraction
of  female directors is successfully instru-
mented. Secondly, by checking the F-test in
the first stage regression; when the F-test is
lower than 10, then the models experience a
weak instrumental variables problem. Thirdly,
by checking the p-value of the Sargan statis-
tics in the second stage regression. Fourthly,
this study conducted an endogeneity test for
the suspected endogenous variable in the sec-
ond stage regression. For the last two ap-
proaches, when the P-value is higher than the
10 percent level, it can be inferred that the
instrumental variables work properly and the
problem can be fully addressed.
The results of first stage regression
(Model 2 and Model 3) in Table 6 indicate
that the instrumental variables are highly cor-
related with the endogenous variable (the
fraction of female directors). The signs of
both Instrumental Variables (IVs) are posi-
tive, which means that the more male direc-
tors there are who have connections with fe-
male directors then the more likely it is that
firms will hire female directors. Moreover, it
is likely that firms follow the composition of
male and female directors in other firms
within the same industry code.
Both Model 2 and Model 3 use the same
instrumental variables, which are the fraction
of male directors who work with female di-
rectors (fem_exp) and the 2-digit industry
code (icb_two). Generally, the more specific
the industry classification is, the larger the F-
test value is in the first stage regression, which
may also be associated with the higher P-val-
ues in the Sargan and endogeneity tests in the
second stage regression. Both instrumental
variables are relatively strong, with F-values
in the first regression of more than 10. The
Sargan statistic test and the endogeneity test
are not significant at the 10 percent level per-
cent.3 However, strong instrumental variables
might affect the significance of the fraction
of  female directors. The estimations of  fe-
male directors are no longer statistically sig-
nificant, although the coefficients are still
positive.
2 This study also uses profit margin as a dependent variable, but the estimations are not presented in this
publication. The estimations can be requested from the author.
3 This paper only presents the Sargan test and the endogeneity test in Table 6 to prove that the endogeneity
problem is fully addressed. The Sargan test and the endogeneity test are not presented in the next regression tables.
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Model 4 is the Arellano-Bond two-step
approach. The lag of  one period of  ROA is
added in the regression as this model is a dy-
namic model. As a consequence, the number
of  observations decreases. Two important
statistics for creating the model are the
Arellano-Bond for AR(2) value and the
Hansen test for over-identification restric-
tions. At the first attempt, the study uses one
period of lag of the fraction of women di-
rectors, but the Hansen test still reports sig-
nificance at the 5.7 percent level. Conse-
quently, the Arellano-Bond model is re-speci-
fied by using a two period lag of the fraction
of  women directors. The endogeneity is fully
addressed, with the P-value of  Hansen’s test
at more than the 10 percent level.
The findings in Table 6 show that there
is a tendency that female directors can posi-
tively influence firm performance. But, the
estimations lack significance. Yet, there is the
possibility that the effects may be negative
in Model 4 (Table 6). Thus, this finding can-
not reject the first hypothesis, in which there
might be no association between female di-
rectors and firm performance. This finding
can be deemed robust as endogeneity has been
addressed in both analyses.
The effects of  female directors on firm
performance with respect to firm size
This analysis divides the observations
into two sub-samples according to the size
of  the firms, which is the proxy of  firm gov-
Table 6. The Regression Estimations: ROA and Fraction of  Female Directors
VARIABLES 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Ols iv_fe1 iv_fe2 ar_bond 
Roa Roa Roa Roa 
fract_women 0.064** 0.385 0.005 -0.059 (2.075) (0.583) (0.018) (-0.372) 
ln_bsize 
0.014 -0.006 0.003 -0.061 
(1.044) (-0.302) (0.182) (-0.835) 
prop_ned 
-0.048* -0.066** -0.073** 0.036 
(-1.939) (-2.194) (-2.453) (0.243) 
ln_employf 
0.065*** 0.030*** 0.028*** -0.044* 
(26.514) (5.614) (5.299) (-1.831) 
block 
0.116*** 0.011 0.001 0.211 
(5.099) (0.336) (0.022) (1.633) 
ln_firm_age 
0.035*** 0.014 -0.007 0.070 
(11.448) (0.740) (-0.570) (1.505) 
debt_ratio 
-0.372*** -0.443*** -0.448*** -0.508** 
(-17.361) (-30.800) (-31.760) (-2.422) 
Lag_roa    0.170*** 
   (3.622) 
Fem_exp 
 0.013** 0.016***  
 (2.30) (2.70)  
Icb_two 
 0.577*** 0.948***  
 (6.13) (15.42)  
Constant 
-0.680***    
(-10.429) 
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VARIABLES 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Ols iv_fe1 iv_fe2 ar_bond 
Roa Roa Roa Roa 
Year Yes Yes No Yes 
Industry Yes No No No 
Observations 9,884 9,771 9,771 4,998 
R-squared 0.276 0.119 0.118  
ll -2471 1484 1475 . 
Number of firm_id 
 1,669 1,669 1,254 
 
Weak-instrument-robust inference from 1st stage regression  
Test of joint significance of endogenous regressors B1 in main equation    
Ho: H1=0 and orthogonality 
conditions are valid 
    
Anderson-Rubin Wald test F(28,086) = 1.25 p-val= 0.2875 
Anderson-Rubin Wald test Chi-sq(2)= 2.50 p-val= 0.2867 
Stock-Wright LM S statistic Chi-sq(2)= 2.50 p-val= 0.2868 
Number of Regressors  K = 15   
Number of Endogenous Regressors K1= 1 
 
 
Number of Instruments  L= 16 
 
 
Number of Excluded Instruments L1= 2 
 
 
Test for IV (2SLS) Estimation     
Sargan statistics (over identification test of all instruments): 2.153 
    Chi-sq (1) P-val= 0.1423 
-Endog- option:      
Endogeneity test of endogenous 
regressors: 
    0.133 
    Chi-sq (1) P-val= 0.7151 
 
Table 6. Continued
Firm performance is regressed with the female directors’ measure and control variables. Roa is the net profit divided by the total
assets (ROA). Fract_women is the fraction of  female directors on the board. ln_bsize is the natural logarithm of  the total
number of directors. Prop_ned is the fraction of non-executive directors. ln_employf is the natural logarithm of the total
number of employees of the firm. Block is the percentage owned by the top shareholder. Ln_firm_age is the natural logarithm
of  (firm age +1). Debt_ratio is the total debt divided by the total assets. Lag_roa is a one period lag of  ROA. ICB_two is the
fraction of  female directors within the same 2-digit industry code. Fem_exp is the fraction of  male directors who ever worked
with female directors on other boards. Model 1 employs the OLS estimation. Model 2 and Model 3 employ 2SLS with IV
(Instrumental Variables). Model 4 employs the Arellano-Bond method. Roa and debt_ratio are winsorized at 1 percent and
percent. The robust t-statistics of each coefficient are shown in parentheses.
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ernance. The analysis uses firms with total
employees that are lower than the 25th quartile
and higher than the 75th quartile, for small
and large firms respectively.
Table 7 presents the estimations be-
tween female directors and the ROA for small
firms. Almost all of  the coefficients of  fe-
male directors are positive and statistically
significant. The endogeneity problem in
Model 2 and Model 3 can be fully addressed.
Consistently, the Arellano-Bond model shows
that female directors can positively and sig-
nificantly affect the ROA at the 5 percent
level percent. Thus, the study rejects the third
hypothesis.
The next regression uses large firms only
as the research observation. The effects of
female directors on large firms are substan-
tially different from their effects on small
firms. Table 8 shows that most of  the esti-
mations of female directors are negative. The
effects are even statistically significant at the
10 percent level, after addressing the
endogeneity problem (Model 2). The
Arellano-Bond model supports the negative
relation of  female directors and the ROA for
large firms although it lacks significance.
Thus, the study cannot reject the second hy-
pothesis.
One interesting result in Table 8 is the
male directors’ connections with female di-
rectors has an opposite direction to that ex-
pected. The male directors’ connections do
not affect the percentage of female directors
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 ols_a ivfe1_a ivfe2_a ar_bond_a 
VARIABLES Roa Roa Roa Roa 
fract_women 
0.216** 5.590 3.056** 0.751** 
(2.086) (1.483) (2.438) (2.136) 
ln_bsize 0.121*** -0.080 -0.025 -0.228* 
(3.364) (-0.781) (-0.438) (-1.652) 
prop_ned 0.027 -0.130 -0.157* -0.006 
(0.424) (-1.220) (-1.729) (-0.026) 
block 0.193*** 0.027 0.000 0.409* 
(3.060) (0.213) (0.002) (1.871) 
ln_firm_age 0.100*** 0.157* 0.024 0.181** 
(8.481) (1.771) (0.723) (2.082) 
debt_ratio -0.482*** -0.451*** -0.506*** -0.721*** 
(-13.832) (-5.442) (-11.764) (-3.184) 
Lag_roa    0.145*** 
   (2.911) 
Fem_exp  0.015 0.017  
 (1.10) (1.26)  
ICB_two  0.397   
 (2.02)**   
Table 7. Female Directors and ROA for Small Firms
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on the boards. It is likely that the females’
connections are not an essential feature for
female director candidates to be appointed
to large firms.
Research Discussion
There is a little evidence that the frac-
tion of female directors can positively and
directly influence firm performance as the
relationship lacks significance. This study
supports previous studies, which found diffi-
culty in finding a direct and positive associa-
tion between female directors and firm per-
formance, such as those by Smith et al. (2006)
Adams and Ferreira (2009), Jurkus et al.
(2011), and Ahern and Dittmar (2012).
One of the possible reasons is due to
imposing quotas, which forces the firms to
appoint more female directors. The latest fig-
ures have shown that firms tend to appoint
women as non-executive directors, while the
number of female executive directors – who
are responsible for running the firm – remains
stagnant (Stern 2014). The contributions of
these non-executive female directors to firm
performance are less visible, as they are re-
sponsible for the monitoring roles, for ex-
ample the CEOs’ turnover and financial re-
porting standards.
Furthermore, the imposition of  gender
diversity is applied in the developed markets,
while most of the stock market regulators in
Table 7. Continued
Firm performance is regressed with the female directors’ measure and control variables. Small firms refer to firms with total
assets lower than the 25th quartile. Roa is the net profit divided by the total assets (ROA).  Fract_women is the fraction of
female directors on the board. ln_bsize is the natural logarithm of the total number of directors. Prop_ned is the fraction of
non-executive directors. ln_emplyf is the natural logarithm of the total number of employees of the firm. Block is the
percentage owned by the top shareholder. Ln_firm_age is the natural logarithm of (firm age +1). Debt_ratio is the total debt
divided by the total assets. Lag_roa is a one period lag of  ROA. ICB_two is the fraction of  female directors within the same
2-digit industry code. ICB_four is the fraction of  female directors within the same 4-digit industry code. Fem_exp is the
fraction of male directors who ever worked with female directors on other boards. Model 1 employs the OLS estimation.
Model 2 and Model 3 employ 2SLS with IV (Instrumental Variables).  Model 4 employs the Arellano-Bond method. Roa and
debt_ratio are winsorized at 1 percent and 99 percent. The robust t-statistics of each coefficient are shown in parentheses.
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 ols_a ivfe1_a ivfe2_a ar_bond_a 
VARIABLES Roa Roa Roa Roa 
ICB_four   0.565***  
  (5.73)  
Constant -1.071***    
(-8.525)    
     
Year Yes No Yes Yes 
Industry Yes No No No 
Observations 2,423 2,266 2,266 1,409 
R-squared 0.214 -0.318 0.026  
ll -1,592 -1,139 -796.6 . 
Number of firm_id  498 498 449 
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Table 8. Female Directors and ROA for Large Firms
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES ols_a ivfe1_a ivfe2_a ar_bond_a 
 Roa Roa Roa Roa 
fract_women 
0.070** -0.528* -0.251 -0.045 
(2.310) (-1.664) (-1.617) (-0.729) 
ln_bsize 
0.193*** -0.004 -0.001 -0.050 
(9.336) (-0.224) (-0.052) (-1.166) 
prop_ned 
0.166*** 0.029 0.011 -0.071 
(4.152) (0.736) (0.289) (-0.673) 
Block 
0.022 -0.089** -0.091** 0.102 
(0.672) (-2.336) (-2.453) (0.763) 
ln_firm_age 
0.004 0.004 -0.012 0.001 
(1.306) (0.219) (-0.842) (0.021) 
debt_ratio 
-0.189*** -0.291*** -0.298*** -0.119 
(-4.318) (-13.650) (-14.853) (-1.090) 
Lag_roa    0.165* 
Fem_exp 
 -0.023** -0.027**  
 (-1.98) (-2.34)  
ICB_two 
  1.39***  
  (12.64)  
ICB_three 
 0.737***   
 (6.17)   
Constant  
-0.337***    
(-6.733)    
Year Yes No Yes Yes 
Industry Yes No No No 
Observations 2,691 2,586 2,586 1,810 
R-squared 0.192 0.061 0.091  
Ll 753.9 2,372 2,415 . 
Number of firm_id  429 429 414 
 Firm performance is regressed with the female directors’ measure and control variables.  Large firms refer to firms with total
assets higher than the 75th quartile. Roa is the net profit divided by the total assets (ROA). Fract_women is the fraction of  female
directors on the boards. ln_bsize is the natural logarithm of the total number of directors. Prop_ned is the fraction of non-
executive directors. ln_emplyf is the natural logarithm of the total number of employees of the firm. Block is the percentage
owned by the top shareholder. Ln_firm_age is the natural logarithm of (firm age +1). Debt_ratio is the total debt divided by the
total assets. Lag_roa is a one period lag of  ROA. ICB_two is the fraction of  female directors within the same 2-digit industry
code. ICB_three is the fraction of  female directors within the same 3-digit industry code. Fem_exp is the fraction of  male
directors who ever worked with female directors on other boards. Model 1 employs the OLS estimation. Model 2 and Model 3
employ 2SLS with IV (Instrumental Variables).  Model 4 employs the Arellano-Bond method. Roa and debt_ratio are winsorized
at 1 percent and 99 percent. The robust t-statistics of each coefficient are shown in parentheses.
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the developing countries do not restrict it. In
other words, firms in the developed countries
have less flexibility to compose their optimal
board structures, because their boards are
assembled as a result of certain types of pres-
sure being applied, rather than purely from
their businesses’ perspectives.
In the UK’s case, the London Stock
Exchange (LSE) is slightly more unique, in
terms of  its governance standards. Large
listed firms experience stricter rules for their
governance structures than the small listed
firms do. The recommendation of  gender di-
versity on the boards is aimed at the
FTSE100 firms rather than all the LSE listed
firms. The UK’s small listed firms have the
flexibility to appoint female directors, which
can lead to better firm performance. There-
fore, this study fails to show that female di-
rectors do have positive and direct impacts
on firm performance.
This result also can be explained from
the theoretical perspective, namely the agency
theory, the resource dependence theory, the
stakeholder theory, and the human capital
theory. The insignificance might be a result
of the incompetency of female directors, or
certain external pressures to appoint female
directors (i.e. female directors’ quotas). In
other words, the relationship between female
directors and firm performance is not straight-
forward because there are many theories that
are involved in that relationship.
Consequently, the next analysis is to
split the dataset into two categories, which
are small firms and large firms. This analysis
is so useful because the UK’s large listed
firms are more regulated than the small listed
ones. The findings indicate that female direc-
tors significantly affect small firms’ perfor-
mance after controlling the endogeneity prob-
lem, while similar findings cannot be found
for the large listed firms.
The results can be explained in two
ways. Firstly, the over-monitoring problem:
according to Carter el al (2003), board diver-
sity may be equivalent to board indepen-
dence, and its main role is monitoring. Ap-
pointing female directors will cause over-
monitoring problems for well-governed firms
(Adams and Ferreira 2009; Jurkus et al. 2011).
Consequently, large firms, which are the proxy
of  well-governed firms, do not experience
positive impacts on firm performance by ap-
pointing female directors.
Secondly, the recommendations (manda-
tory requirements) by the UK regulator for
appointing more females to the boards could
be the plausible reason why the female direc-
tors’ contributions in large firms is less sig-
nificant than in small firms. Wintoki (2007)
reports that there is no evidence the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of  2002 (SOX) improved firm
value in the US. Similarly, Ahern and Dittmar
(2012) report that quotas for females did not
improve firm values in Norway. The recom-
mendation of gender diversity on boards in
the UK is mainly aimed at the FTSE100 and
FTSE250 firms. As a result, large firms tend
to hire female directors in order to meet the
regulations (quotas) rather that out of neces-
sity or for strategic reasons.  On the other
hand, small firms have the flexibility to de-
cide the make-up of their boards of direc-
tors in the absence of  such regulations.
Conclusion and Implications
The mixed findings for the relationship
between female directors and firm perfor-
mance are the main motivation of  this study.
Some studies (Erhardt et al. 2003; Carter et
al. 2003; Campbell and Minguez-Vera 2007,
Luckerath-Rovers 2013; Liu et al. 2014;
Strom et al. 2014) have found a positive as-
sociation while others (Smith et al. 2006;
Pasaribu
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Rose 2007; Adams and Ferreira 2009; Ahern
and Dittmar 2012) did not find the same re-
sult. Moreover, it is reported that the rela-
tionship between female directors and firm
performance is not straightforward (Adams
and Ferreira 2009; Jurkus et al 2011). Given
these findings, the study did not only exam-
ine the influence of  female directors on firm
performance, but also tried to employ a cer-
tain condition, namely firm size, in the analy-
sis.
This study has two important findings
to report. Firstly, it is less likely that female
directors have a significant influence on firm
performance in the UK. Even though the
estimations of the effect female directors
have on the ROA are positive, they are not
statistically significant. Secondly, the positive
impact of female directors is stronger in small
firms. This may be caused because: (1) large
firms, which are associated with strong gov-
ernance, encounter over-monitoring problems
after appointing female directors (Adams and
Ferreira 2009; Jurkus et al. 2011) and (2) large
firms encounter greater external intervention
than small firms when it comes to the com-
position of  their boards of  directors.
This study has several implications. For
firms, they should consider certain aspects
when deciding to appoint female directors,
in order to optimize their contribution, e.g.
the firms’ current levels of  governance. More-
over, when firms encounter certain pressures
from external parties regarding the appoint-
ment of  female directors, firms must assess
and select the candidates very carefully to get
the most benefit from them.
For governments or market regulators,
imposing quotas has successfully increased
females participation on the boards, particu-
larly in the UK. This means governments can
push their agendas onto the corporate world.
But, such regulations should not be too strict
as the policy may not lead to a better bot-
tom-line for the firms. Lastly, the study has
confirmed that the relationship between fe-
male directors and firm performance is prone
to the endogeneity problem. Further study
into this topic should not rely entirely on the
OLS model, as it will result in biased estima-
tions.
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